

# Tropical tuna social risk profile

Forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous  
child labor risks

Taiwan, Fishing and Processing

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SEAFOOD SOCIAL RISK TOOL V2

## Disclaimer

The Seafood Social Risk Tool has been prepared for information purposes only, and is not intended to constitute business, legal, market, financial or investment advice. The Seafood Social Risk Tool is designed to serve as an informational resource and does not override legislation or internal policies or procedures. It is recommended that all users of the Seafood Social Risk Tool seek independent legal advice. The Monterey Bay Aquarium Foundation shall not be responsible to any party related to its use or interpretation of the information contained in the Seafood Social Risk Tool.

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# About the Seafood Social Risk Tool

The Seafood Social Risk Tool profiles seafood production systems around the world and identifies areas within those systems that are at higher risk of containing forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor to help businesses begin to focus their efforts to improve human rights and labor conditions.

The tool includes more than 80 indicators of risk based on publicly available evidence of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor abuses in seafood supply chains as well as an analysis of information about risk factors correlated with these abuses. This information is packaged into risk profiles specified by species and country of origin designed to help businesses better identify the potential for human rights abuses in their supply chains so they can take the first steps toward improving conditions for seafood workers.

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The Seafood Social Risk Tool was created in partnership with the Monterey Bay Aquarium, Sustainable Fisheries Partnership, Liberty Shared, and a team of human rights experts.

Monterey Bay Aquarium's Seafood Watch program raises awareness of important ocean conservation issues and empowers seafood consumers and businesses to make choices for healthy oceans.

Sustainable Fisheries Partnership is a US-registered nonprofit that operates globally to rebuild depleted fish stocks and reduce the environmental and social impacts of fishing and fish farming. The organization works by engaging fishery stakeholders and seafood businesses throughout the supply chain to promote the sustainable production of seafood.

Liberty Shared aims to prevent human trafficking through legal advocacy, technological interventions, and strategic collaborations with NGOs, corporations, and financial institutions globally.

To learn more about Seafood Watch, to view our seafood recommendations, or to view the Seafood Social Risk Tool, [visit SeafoodWatch.org](https://www.seafoodwatch.org).

## Overview

Taiwan operates the world's second largest distant water fishing (DWF) fleet by effort, predominantly targeting tuna.<sup>i</sup> China accounts for around 38 percent of the world's DWF effort in other countries' waters, followed by Taiwan at around 21.5 percent, with other top countries, Spain, Japan, and South Korea contributing about 10 percent each.<sup>ii</sup> Taiwan's DWF fleet mainly comprises longline fishing vessels targeting tuna in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.<sup>iii</sup> There is a small tuna processing industry within Taiwan but much of the country's distant water catch is landed at foreign ports where it is sold for processing and export.<sup>iv</sup> Taiwan's main seafood exports include bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin tuna products, which are primarily destined for Japan and Thailand.<sup>v</sup>

## Base risks of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor in the country in general

Taiwan's complex political status means that key indices and data sources used to inform the SSRT's country level analysis are often not available for Taiwan. This paucity of data makes it difficult to ascertain the base level of risk of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor in Taiwan. Based upon what information is available, factors such as low levels of perceived corruption; better perceptions of governance generally; and fewer violations of workers' rights compared to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region; are indicative of lower risk. However, there appear to be significantly heightened risks for foreign migrant workers in the Taiwanese workforce, driven by the commonplace use of recruitment agents or brokers to hire low-skilled foreign migrant labor.<sup>vi</sup> Excessive recruitment fees charged by some recruiters and the resulting debts leave foreign workers vulnerable to forced labor.<sup>vii</sup> Furthermore, the immigration status of foreign workers is dependent on their contracted position, increasing the likelihood of workers staying with abusive employers.<sup>viii</sup> Nevertheless, Taiwan has been steadily improving the laws and regulations for protecting migrant workers from forced labor, and it has sustained efforts to eliminate human trafficking despite the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.<sup>ix</sup> In May 2022, the executive branch of the government, the Executive Yuan, announced a national human rights action plan to raise human rights standards in Taiwan.<sup>x</sup>

## Adjusted risks of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor in the country's seafood supply chain

There is a high risk of human rights abuses in Taiwan's seafood supply chain and, more specifically, in Taiwan's distant water fishing (DWF) fleet, which primarily fishes for tuna. Following national and international pressure, Taiwan's government and seafood industry have made efforts to address the problem in the DWF fleet, with several changes implemented in recent years. Nevertheless, the

effectiveness of these changes remains to be seen as reports of human rights and labor abuses continue and further reforms are likely to be needed.

Evidence suggests that forced labor and conditions indicative of forced labor are systemic in Taiwan's DWF fleet. Investigations by non-governmental organizations like Environmental Justice Foundation and Greenpeace have revealed egregious abuses in the DWF fleet.<sup>xi</sup> Alleged abuses toward fishers working on Taiwanese vessels include, among others, non-payment of wages, physical violence and threats of violence, and the withholding of food and water by senior crewmembers.<sup>xii</sup> The US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued multiple withhold release orders against tuna and other seafood from Taiwanese flagged and/or owned fishing vessels, citing information indicating forced labor. Most recently, the US CBP issued a withhold release order against tuna from the Taiwanese flagged and owned DWF vessel, the 'Lien Yi Hsing No. 12', effective December 31, 2020.<sup>xiii</sup>

The prevalence of foreign migrant workers in Taiwan's DWF fleet<sup>xiv</sup> combined with gaps in legal protections for those workers increases the already heightened risks of forced labor and human trafficking for foreign migrant workers in Taiwan. Migrant fishers in the DWF fleet spend prolonged periods at sea, have limited access to workers' unions in Taiwan, and risk deportation if they complain about their working conditions, making it difficult for them to change their circumstances.<sup>xv,xvi</sup>

Correlated risks such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; transshipment at sea; and the use of flags of convenience (FOCs) are present in Taiwan's DWF fleet. Transshipment at sea and the landing of much of Taiwan's catch in foreign ports limits transparency and oversight of fishing activities in general.<sup>xvii</sup> While fisheries observers are engaged on some vessels to monitor environmental conditions, they face significant threats, as shown by the suspicious death of fisheries observer, Eritara Kaierua, onboard the Taiwanese flagged vessel 'Win Far No. 636' in 2020.<sup>xviii,xix</sup> The Fisheries Agency has made efforts to address IUU fishing, resulting in the revocation of the European Commission's yellow card for IUU fishing in 2019, but Taiwan continues to be linked to IUU fishing.<sup>xx,xxi,xxii</sup>

Enforcement of forced labor laws is weak in Taiwan's seafood industry and is made more challenging by the difficult-to-reach nature of the DWF fleet. Taiwanese authorities have reportedly committed insufficient resources to identify, investigate, and prosecute forced labor in the coastal-offshore and distant water fishing industries.<sup>xxiii</sup> In the past, corruption among local government officials has further impeded efforts to address forced labor in fishing.<sup>xxiv</sup> While the Fisheries Agency claims to have made multiple improvements concerning the protection of crew in the DWF fleet, non-governmental organizations continue to express serious concerns about the Taiwanese government's "failure" to address human rights abuses in fishing.<sup>xxv,xxvi</sup> Nevertheless, recent signs of improvement are promising. These include a public commitment to increasing the manpower of the agency and the frequency of fishing vessel inspections,<sup>xxvii</sup> and the prosecution of the captain, first mate, and several crew members of the Vanuatu-flagged, Taiwanese owned and operated vessel 'Da Wang' for their suspected involvement in the abuse of foreign migrant crew members.<sup>xxviii</sup> On 21<sup>st</sup> April 2022, the Executive Yuan announced a new plan to address human rights in the

fishing industry and the government's intent to invest over NT\$2 billion (US\$68.5 million) to implement this plan.<sup>xxix</sup> If implemented successfully, this plan could strengthen the rights of migrant workers and improve monitoring and enforcement in the distant water fishery.

## Summary of evidence of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor in the seafood supply chain

Country-level indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Forced labor occurs in domestic services, agriculture and fishing, manufacturing, meat processing, and construction in Taiwan. In addition, foreign migrants and Taiwanese women and children are subject to sex trafficking in Taiwan.</li> </ul>
Seafood industry-level Indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is evidence of forced labor in Taiwan's fishing industry. These abuses are especially prevalent in the distant water fishing (DWF) fleet.</li> <li>'Fish' from Taiwan is identified as a good produced by forced labor by the US Department of Labor's 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, with specific reference to Taiwan's DWF fleet.</li> </ul>
Fishing indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Investigations by non-governmental organizations found evidence of forced labor including debt bondage, the withholding of wages, and abusive working and living conditions on board Taiwanese tuna long liners.</li> <li>The US Customs and Border Protection has issued multiple withhold release orders against tuna and other seafood from Taiwanese flagged and/or owned fishing vessels, citing indicators of forced labor as the reason.</li> </ul>
Processing indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence was found linking Taiwan's tuna processing industry directly to human trafficking, forced labor, or hazardous child labor.</li> </ul>

# Summary of factors that affect the likelihood of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor in the seafood supply chain

## Factors that increase the likelihood

### Country-level indicators

- Taiwan has not been assessed independently against many of the SSRT's country-level indicators, making it difficult to ascertain the base level of risk in the country.
- Taiwan is a major destination for low-skilled migrant workers from Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, which are known origin countries for human trafficking victims.
- Taiwan operates a two-tiered visa system for migrant fishers, wherein migrant fishers in the distant water fishery are afforded fewer rights and protections compared to migrant fishers in the coastal-offshore fishery.
- Use of third-party recruitment agents and labor brokers to hire migrant workers is common.
- Taiwan is not a member of the ILO or the UN and therefore cannot ratify key international instruments such as the ILO Work in Fishing Convention 188 or Protocol 29 on forced labor.

### Seafood industry-level indicators

- The 2018 Global Slavery Index (GSI) for fishing identifies Taiwan as being at "high-risk of modern slavery" in the fishing industry. High risk factors relate to the country's "National Fisheries Policy" (catch outside EEZ, distant water fishing, and subsidies).
- Taiwanese enforcement authorities lack the specialist knowledge or resources needed to effectively enforce forced labor regulations in the distant water fishing fleet.
- Onboard fisheries observers face significant risks of human rights abuse.
- There is limited access to trade unions for migrant workers. The two available unions are understaffed and put under pressure to not act against the government.
- Migrant fishers risk harassment by labor brokers and ship captains if they make a complaint about working conditions.

### Fishing indicators

- Crew on distant water fishing vessels spend up to three years at sea per trip.
- Some tropical tuna stocks caught in the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean are overfished or being overfished.
- The use of transshipment and flags of convenience is commonplace in Taiwan's distant water fishing (DWF) fleet.
- Taiwanese tuna vessels have been linked to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
- Most fishers in the DWF fleet are foreign migrant workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Taiwanese indigenous peoples are also employed in the DWF fleet.
- Use of third-party recruitment agents to hire fishing crew for the DWF fleet is common.

- Legal provisions for compensation of foreign migrant workers in the DWF fleet are below that granted by Taiwan's Labor Standards Act and there is evidence of recruitment fees diminishing wages further still.

#### Processing indicators

- No information on the tuna processing workforce in Taiwan was found making it difficult to assess risk in the sector.

## Factors that decrease the likelihood

#### Country-level indicators

- Taiwan performs well against the country-level indices for governance, corruption, and respect for workers' rights compared to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Taiwan has been working to transpose the ILO Work in Fishing Convention 188 into its domestic legislation (even if it cannot ratify the convention).
- Despite the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, Taiwan increased its law enforcement efforts regarding human trafficking in 2020 and 2021.

#### Seafood industry-level indicators

- The Taiwanese government has shown signs of continued effort to improve monitoring and enforcement of labor rights in fishing, including a public commitment to increasing manpower in the Fisheries Agency and increasing the frequency of fishing vessel inspections.
- There is evidence of industry participation in voluntary schemes to improve labor conditions and environmental oversight in fishing, including the trialing of a surveillance system on distant water fishing vessels to monitor working conditions and identify labor abuses.

#### Fishing indicators

- Taiwan has made significant efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, resulting in the yellow card issued in October 2015 by the European commission being revoked in June 2019.
- The government has committed to increase wages for migrant fishers and limit the maximum continuous time at sea to 10 months, beginning July 2022.

#### Processing indicators

- Taiwan's tuna processing industry is small and oriented heavily towards exports.



## Fishing

Taiwan's fishing industry is known mostly for its distant water fishing (DWF) fleet, which operates outside of the country's two hundred nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The DWF fleet mainly operates in the Pacific and Indian Oceans,<sup>xxx</sup> as well as in the Atlantic.<sup>xxxi</sup> The DWF fleet fishes primarily for tuna.<sup>xxxii</sup> According to 2015 data from Taiwan's Fisheries Agency (FA), the DWF fleet comprises more than 2,000 fishing vessels targeting tuna and other species.<sup>xxxiii</sup> More recently published information from Chiang and Rogovin (2020) indicates that Taiwan's DWF fleet includes more than 1,100 Taiwanese flagged vessels as well as vessels that are owned or funded by Taiwanese nationals but flagged to other nations.<sup>xxxiv</sup> The main fishing gears used include longline and purse seine gear.<sup>xxxv</sup> Taiwan's political status limits its ability to participate within the regional fisheries management organizations.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Nevertheless, Taiwan is a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and a cooperating country of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT).

## Processing and Trade

Much of the fish caught by Taiwan's DWF fleet is landed in foreign ports and sold for processing and export, making it difficult to estimate the scale of the industry,<sup>xxvii</sup> or to estimate how much tuna landed by the Taiwanese fleet is destined for export to North American and European markets. Within Taiwan, fish is mainly landed in southern Taiwan, including Kaohsiung City, and to a lesser extent Tainan City and Pingtung County.<sup>xxviii</sup> Taiwan has a small fish processing sector. The export-oriented canning industry is very small, with only one tuna processing company certified to export to the European Union.<sup>xxix</sup> Tropical tuna is among Taiwan's main fisheries export products.<sup>xl</sup> The majority of fish caught by Taiwan's DWF fleet, including tropical tuna, is exported to Japan and Thailand, while fish caught by Taiwan's inshore fishing fleet supplies the domestic market.<sup>xli</sup>

# Due Diligence for Tropical Tuna in Taiwan

## Important Country-Specific Considerations

- Taiwan's complex political status affects its ability to formally ratify most international agreements and limits its assessment by key data sources used to inform the SSRT's country level analysis.
- Taiwan's distant water fishery has been linked to systematic practices of forced labor and conditions indicative of forced labor, as well as correlated risks of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; transshipment at sea; and the use of flags of convenience.
- Taiwan authorities do not have the capacity needed to effectively identify forced labor in the distant water fleet and migrant fishers have limited access to grievance mechanisms.
- Limited information was found on tuna processing in Taiwan.

## Suggested Due Diligence Priorities & Questions

### Recruitment

Use of recruitment agents to hire fishing crew for Taiwan's distant water fishery is common. Migrant fishers are regularly subjected to recruitment fees, resulting in fishers becoming debt bonded.

1. Are workers hired directly and/or through recruitment agents?
2. What procedures are in place to manage recruitment agents, including those in foreign countries? Are there screening and evaluation processes prior to engaging with recruitment agents?
3. Do you know how recruitment agents comply with the 'Employer Pays Principle', including whether they have a procedure for verifying that workers are not charged fees and a mechanism for workers to report violations?
4. What procedures are in place to ensure workers have unrestricted access to their documents (such as identity or immigration documents and work agreements)?

### Complaints mechanism

Access to trade unions and grievance mechanisms is limited for migrant fishers, especially in the distant water fishery.

1. Do workers in your operation/supply chain have access to third party support such as trade union representatives?
2. Do workers in your operation/supply chain have access to a complaint mechanism?

3. Are there procedures to document, track, and resolve workplace grievances and complaints?

### **Worker demographics**

No information on the tuna processing workforce in Taiwan was found.

1. Do processing operations employ mostly migrant laborers or ethnic minorities? What countries or parts of the country do the workers come from?
2. Do workers have documented legal work permits? If so, who manages these permits?
3. What proportion of workers are considered low-skilled in the work environment?
4. What is the proportion of temporary and contract workers to permanent workers?
5. What is the proportion of women in the workforce? Are women in managerial roles?

## Taiwan: Country-level indicators

Indicator	Description	Sources
Poverty levels in a country	Human Development Index Not available.	<a href="#">UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)</a>
	Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line Not available.	<a href="#">World Bank</a>
	Global Hunger Index Not available.	<a href="#">Global Hunger Index (GHI)</a>
Country's position in the regional economic power system	Comparing HDI ranking to other countries in the region Not available.	<a href="#">UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)</a>  <a href="#">UNDP Global Human Development Indicators Country Profile</a>
	Comparing its recent economic growth to the general economic growth rates in the region Not available.	<a href="#">World Bank Databank figures on annual economic growth</a>
	Migration data  Net migration rate (immigrants minus emigrants per 1,000 population) for Taiwan is: 0.75 (2021 est.)  Migration inflows (2021): Unknown	<a href="#">Migration Policy Institute, Country Profile: Taiwan</a>
	Regional migration trends and patterns  Taiwan is mainly a receiving country for foreign migrants from South-East Asia. To a lesser extent, it is also a sending country for skilled migrants to countries in South-East Asia	<a href="#">Migration Policy Institute, 2012, Tradition and Progress: Taiwan's</a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>in response to Taiwanese investment in those countries. <a href="#">Ching-lung Tsay, 2015</a></p> <p>In addition to being a key destination for foreign migrants, northern Taiwan is also a major destination for internal migrants. <a href="#">Migration Policy, 2012</a></p> <p>Since the 1960s, Taiwan has allowed unrestricted immigration by educated foreign migrants, with most coming from the United States, Japan, and Europe. In contrast, immigration of low-skilled migrant workers was banned until the early 1990s. <a href="#">Migration Policy, 2012</a></p> <p>Labor shortages in several major public construction projects in the late 1980s prompted the government to allow in construction workers from Thailand. After that, Taiwan began to open to contract workers from selected countries in South-East Asia. <a href="#">Ching-lung Tsay, 2015</a></p> <p>Following the introduction of the Employment Service Act (ESA) in 1992, viewed as the first major law to legalize foreign low-skilled migrants to Taiwan, the number of foreign labor migrants to the country grew significantly from just over 11,000 in 1992. <a href="#">Deng, Wahyuni, &amp; Yulianto, 2020</a></p> <p>Since then, labor migration into Taiwan has fluxed over time, with both Taiwan and the sending countries placing a freeze on movement of migrant workers into the country at differing times for varying economic and political reasons including unemployment rates in Taiwan, labor sanctions, and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. <a href="#">Migration News, September 1996</a> , <a href="#">Staffing Industry Analysts, 05 August 2013</a> , <a href="#">Focus Taiwan, 09 January 2021</a></p> <p>According to statistics from the National Immigration Agency of Taiwan, there were 760,680 foreign residents in Taiwan as of late 2021. Of those, a majority were living in Taoyuan City, Taichung City, and New Taipei City in</p>	<p><a href="#">Evolving Migration Reality</a></p> <p><a href="#">Ching-lung Tsay, 2015, Migration between Southeast Asia and Taiwan: Trends, Characteristics and Implications. Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2015), pp. 68-92</a></p> <p><a href="#">Deng, J-B., Wahyuni, H.I., &amp; Yulianto, V.I., 2020, Labor migration from Southeast Asia to Taiwan: issues, public responses and future development. Asian Education and Development Studies, Issue 23</a></p> <p><a href="#">Migration News, September 1996, Taiwan Freezes Worker Imports, Volume 3, Number 9</a></p> <p><a href="#">Staffing Industry Analysts, 05 August 2013, 'Taiwan – Substitute labourers needed amid Philippines recruitment freeze'</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>northern and central Taiwan. By number of foreign residents in Taiwan, the major sending countries were Vietnam (232,279), Indonesia (231,803), Philippines (147,861), and to a lesser extent, Thailand (63,901). <a href="#">National Immigration Agency, 2021.10 Foreign Residents by Nationality</a></p> <p>The influx of migrant workers from these four countries appears to have been largely driven by economic differences between the four sending countries and Taiwan, labor shortages in Taiwan, and the high unemployment rates in some of those sending countries. <a href="#">Ching-lung Tsay, 2015</a> , <a href="#">Deng, Wahyuni, &amp; Yulianto, 2020</a></p> <p>Foreign contract workers are mostly employed in the industrial sector; which includes agriculture and fishing, manufacturing, and construction; and as care workers and domestic workers. The immigrants are selected from the lower end of the income distribution and are typically paid just over minimum wage in their country. <a href="#">Ching-lung Tsay, 2015</a> , <a href="#">Migration Policy, 2012</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Focus Taiwan, 09 January 2021, 'Indonesia freezes export of workers to Taiwan, Japan'. AP Migration</a></p> <p><a href="#">National Immigration Agency, 2021.10 Foreign Residents by Nationality</a></p>
	<p>Known human trafficking routes</p> <p>Women are trafficked from China and Southeast Asian countries into Taiwan under fraudulent pretenses for sex trafficking. Trafficking victims also include migrant workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, China, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka.</p> <p>Meanwhile, Taiwanese people are trafficked to Europe for forced labor and there is emerging evidence on Taiwanese people being trafficked into conditions indicative of forced labor in Cambodia.</p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</a></p> <p><a href="#">The Guardian, 23 August 2022, 'Hundreds of Taiwanese trafficked to Cambodia and held captive by telecom scam gangs'</a></p>
Governance practices and systems in a	<p>WGI (2021) Percentile rank -</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voice and Accountability: 86.47</li> <li>• Political Stability and Absence of Violence: 72.17</li> <li>• Government Effectiveness: 91.83</li> </ul>	<p><a href="#">World Governance Indicators (WGI)</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
country (measured through indexes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulatory Quality: 91.35</li> <li>• Rule of Law: 87.98</li> <li>• Control of Corruption: 85.10</li> </ul> <p>Taiwan ranks in the higher percentiles for all six indicators. Taiwan ranks close to the regional average for East Asia and the Pacific for ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’ but ranks considerably higher than the average for the other five indicators.</p> <p>Note: Percentile rank among all countries ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank, where the higher the percentiles, the better the governance.</p>	
	<p>Corruption Perception Index (2021)</p> <p>Score: 68/100</p> <p>Rank: 25/180 countries and territories</p> <p>More than two-thirds of countries score below 50 on this year’s CPI, with an average score of just 43. Taiwan’s score of 68 places it above the average and positions it 25<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries and territories. Taiwan also scores higher than the regional average for Asia Pacific of 45 out of 100, indicating that perceived levels of corruption are relatively low in Taiwan compared to other countries in the region.</p> <p><b>Neighboring countries</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Philippines: 33/100</li> <li>• China: 45/100</li> <li>• South Korea: 62/100</li> <li>• Vietnam: 39/100</li> <li>• Japan: 73/100</li> </ul> <p>Average score for Asia Pacific region: 45/100</p> <p>Note: Based on 0 = Highly Corrupt, 100 = Very Clean.</p>	<p><u>Transparency International</u>  <u>Corruption Perception Index (CPI)</u></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index (2022)</p> <p>Rank: 103/128 countries</p> <p>Overall score: 4.08/10</p> <p>Taiwan ranks among the top 30 countries in the index, indicating that they have a lower risk for money laundering and terrorist financing than countries that rank lower.</p> <p>Taiwan performs better than its neighboring countries and better than the regional and world averages.</p> <p><b>Neighboring countries</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Philippines: 5.68/10</li> <li>• China: 6.69/10</li> <li>• South Korea: 4.51/10</li> <li>• Vietnam: 7.04</li> <li>• Japan: 4.70/10</li> </ul> <p>Regional average for East Asia and Pacific: 5.52/10</p> <p>World average: 5.3/10</p> <p>Note: Ranking is out of 128 countries; top possible score is 0 (low risk), lowest score is 10 (high risk).</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Basel Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Index</u></a></p>
	<p>Global Rights Index (2022)</p> <p>Rating: 2 (Repeated violations of rights)</p> <p>Taiwan performs better than the regional average ranking of 4.22 for the Asia-Pacific region, which ranks as the second worst region of the world for workers, behind the Middle East and North Africa.</p> <p>Taiwan performs considerably better in the GRI than neighboring countries China, Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam. Japan is also rated 2.</p> <p><b>Neighboring countries</b></p>	<p><a href="#"><u>International Trade Union Conference (ITUC) Global Rights Index (GRI)</u></a></p>



Indicator	Description	Sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Philippines: 5 (No guarantee of rights)</li> <li>China: 5 (No guarantee of rights)</li> <li>South Korea: 5 (No guarantee of rights)</li> <li>Vietnam: 4 (Systematic violations of rights)</li> <li>Japan: 2 (Repeated violations of rights)</li> </ul> <p>Note: Countries are ranked from 1 to 5+, where five plus corresponds to “no guarantee of rights due to the breakdown of the law” and 1 corresponds to “sporadic violations of rights”.</p>	
Education and general literacy levels in a country	<p>Adult literacy rates, among the population aged 15 years and older</p> <p>Not Available.</p>	<a href="#">World Bank Open Data</a>
	<p>Primary school completion rates</p> <p>Not Available.</p>	<a href="#">World Bank Open Data</a>
	<p>Lower secondary education completion rates</p> <p>Not Available.</p>	<a href="#">World Bank Open Data</a>
	<p>School enrolment, tertiary</p> <p>Not Available.</p>	<a href="#">World Bank Open Data</a>
Attitudes towards migrant workers in a country's population	<p>Migrant Acceptance Index 2016 - Taiwan: 6.80/9</p> <p>Taiwan's score of 6.80 out of 9 indicates that people in Taiwan are more accepting of migrants than on average for all countries assessed, with a world score of 5.29/9.</p> <p>Taiwan's score is also higher than that of nearby countries and higher than the average for Southeast Asia, which is 4.48/9.</p> <p><b>Neighboring countries</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Philippines: 6.77/9</li> <li>China: 5.11/9</li> </ul>	<a href="#">Gallup Migrant Acceptance Index</a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• South Korea: 6.49/9</li> <li>• Vietnam: 6.08/9</li> <li>• Japan: 6.42/9</li> <li>• Southeast Asia: 4.48/9</li> </ul> <p>Note: Based on 138 countries surveyed in 2016; U.S. surveyed in 2017; and updated in 2019 (scores not publicly available for all countries); top possible score is 9.0.</p>	
Legislation and regulation to protect migrant workers	<p>Coverage of legal provisions under the labor laws</p> <p>Since Taiwan is not a member of the UN it cannot formally ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. <a href="#">UN Treaty Body Database</a></p> <p>Nevertheless, all laws regulating employment also apply to foreign nationals working in Taiwan. Foreign workers are required to have a resident visa and work permit. The Labor Standards Act is the most important piece of legislation relating to employment, covering most but not all industries and occupations. <a href="#">Employment and Employee Benefits in Taiwan: Overview</a></p> <p>While the Labor Standards Act protects foreign migrant fishers in the coastal-offshore fishery, affording them the same labor rights as Taiwanese citizens, it is not always implemented effectively. Further still, the Labor Standards Act does not apply to migrant fishers in the distant water fishery. Instead, Taiwan's Fisheries Agency oversees protection of foreign crew members in the distant water fishery rather than the Ministry of Labor and it is regulated under the Acts for Distant Water Fisheries and Regulations on the Authorization and Management of Overseas Employment of Foreign Crew Members. This two-tiered visa system excludes migrant workers in the distant water fishery from full labor law coverage. Article 6 of the Overseas Employment Act states that the minimum monthly wage for foreign crew members should be</p>	<p><a href="#">Employment and Employee Benefits in Taiwan: Overview, Christine Chen, Winkler Partners</a></p> <p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">Regulations on the Authorization and Management of Overseas Employment of Foreign Crew Members, Article 6, Council of Agriculture, 2019</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace, 2019, The Two-Tiered System: Discrimination, Modern Slavery and</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>US\$450, which is notably less than the minimum monthly wage of US\$740 granted by the Labor Standards Act. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a> , <a href="#">Council of Agriculture, 2019</a>, <a href="#">Greenpeace, 2019</a></p> <p>On 21<sup>st</sup> April 2022, the Executive Yuan announced a plan to address human rights in the fishing industry. As part of this plan, the government is expected to raise the minimum wage for migrant fishers from US\$450 to \$550 beginning July 2022. <a href="#">Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 21 April 2022</a></p> <p>In response to calls for action from labor and human rights groups since the 1990s, Taiwan has made efforts to improve protections for foreign migrant workers. According to the “Measures for Protecting Rights of Foreign Workers” from the Ministry of Labor, “foreign workers should enjoy the same labor rights as ROC nationals; they should not be discriminated against because of their nationality or suffer worse working conditions.” <a href="#">Ministry of Labor, 2017</a> , <a href="#">Deng, Wahyuni, &amp; Yulianto, 2020</a></p> <p>However, legislation still places restrictions on foreign migrant workers. Low skilled foreign migrants are only afforded temporary visas for work and are not entitled to apply for permanent residence or Taiwanese citizenship. <a href="#">Deng, Wahyuni, &amp; Yulianto, 2020</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Environmental Destruction on the High Seas</a></p> <p><a href="#">Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 21 April 2022, ‘Government promotes plan to improve human rights in fishery industry’</a></p> <p><a href="#">Committee on Migrant Workers</a></p> <p><a href="#">Ministry of Labor, 2017, Descriptions for “Measures for Protecting Rights of Foreign Workers”</a></p> <p><a href="#">Deng, J-B., Wahyuni, H.I., &amp; Yulianto, V.I., 2020, Labor migration from Southeast Asia to Taiwan: issues, public responses and future development. Asian Education and Development Studies, Issue 23</a></p>
	<p>Access to social protection, health, and education</p> <p>According to a 2019 study, 90% of marital and working migrants who come to Taiwan are registered in the universal healthcare system, the National Health Insurance. The high number of migrants registered to have health insurance is most likely due to the fact they are required to</p>	<p><a href="#">Factors Associated with Access of Marital Migrants and Migrant Workers to Healthcare in Taiwan: A Questionnaire Survey with Quantitative</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>register with the NHI after six months of living in Taiwan. The NHI urges all employers to give the same benefits to migrant workers as to Taiwanese nationals. There are still issues with the system, mostly being a lack of interpreters who understand the medical terminology. <a href="#">Feng-Yuan Chu et al. 2019</a></p> <p>There has been an issue with COVID restrictions and in keeping migrant workers isolated when other workers have been released from quarantine. The microchip factory workers had been taken from private residents and moved to dormitories with their movements heavily restricted while Taiwanese citizens do not have these restrictions. <a href="#">Ying-Yu Alicia Chen, 2021</a></p> <p>Foreign migrant workers in the coastal-offshore fishery are afforded the same rights to insurance as Taiwanese citizens, though implementation of these rights is not widespread. Foreign migrant workers in the distant water fishery are only afforded rights to access private insurance and are not entitled to full labor insurance and national health insurance. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Analysis. Feng-Yuan Chu, Hsiao-Ting Chang, Chung-Liang Shih, Cherng-Jye Jeng, Tzeng-Ji Chen, Wui-Chiang Lee. 2019</a></p> <p><a href="#">Equaltimes, Taiwan's foreign factory workers face rights violations amid latest Covid outbreak, Ying-Yu Alicia Chen, 2021</a></p> <p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p>
	<p>Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)s or other agreements specifically designed to protect migrant workers</p> <p>Taiwan has signed an MOU with Indonesia to recruit, place, and protect Indonesian migrant workers. <a href="#">Petir Garda Bhwana, 2018</a></p> <p>Taiwan has signed three MOUs with the Philippines as of 2018, however the source states that these agreements are for maintaining migration and not for the protection of the workers. <a href="#">Five Corridors Project</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Indonesia, Taiwan Sign MoU on Protection of Migrant Workers, Petir Garda Bhwana, 2018</a></p> <p><a href="#">Five Corridors Project, 'Philippines - Taiwan: Bilateral arrangements'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Council on Foreign Relations, 14 June 2021, 'The Time Is</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>There are talks about a trade agreement with the United States. <a href="#">Council on Foreign Relations, 14 June 2021</a></p> <p>The US Trafficking in Persons report states that Taiwanese authorities have joint anti-trafficking investigations with several countries including Kosovo, Montenegro, Paraguay, Serbia, and Vietnam. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Now for a Trade Deal With Taiwan'</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</a></p>
Ratification of relevant international conventions and domestication of conventions into a national legal framework (Forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor)	Convention No. 29 - Taiwan is not a member of the ILO and cannot formally ratify conventions.	<a href="#">Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)</a>
	Convention No. 105 – Taiwan previously ratified this convention, but China declared it invalid in 1984.	<p><a href="#">Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)</a></p> <p><a href="#">"China relations with the ILO." Briefing notes for US Congressional-Executive China Commission Roundtable on Labor Rights, 2002.</a></p>
	Convention No. 138 – Taiwan is not a member of the ILO and cannot formally ratify conventions.	<a href="#">Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)</a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	Convention No. 182 – Taiwan is not a member of the ILO and cannot formally ratify conventions.	<a href="#"><u>Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)</u></a>
	Protocol 29 – Taiwan is not a member of the ILO and cannot formally ratify conventions.	<a href="#"><u>Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (P29)</u></a>
	Palermo Protocol – Taiwan is not a member of the UN and cannot formally ratify this instrument.	<a href="#"><u>Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the ‘Palermo Protocol’)</u></a>
	Convention No. 188 – Taiwan is not a member of the ILO and cannot formally ratify conventions.	<a href="#"><u>ILO Convention 188 on Work in Fishing</u></a>
	PSMA – Taiwan is not a member of the UN and cannot formally ratify this instrument.	<a href="#"><u>The FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)</u></a>
	<p>Domestication into national legislation</p> <p>Taiwan is not a member of the ILO or the UN and cannot formally ratify most international conventions. Nevertheless, Taiwan has incorporated some relevant international standards into its domestic legislation.</p> <p>With regards to forced labor, Article 5 of Taiwan’s Labor Standards Act states that “No employer shall, by force, coercion, detention, or other illegal means, compel a worker to perform work.” <a href="#"><u>Labor Standards Act</u></a></p>	<a href="#"><u>Labor Standards Act</u></a>  <a href="#"><u>US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</u></a>  <a href="#"><u>Yen, K-W., and Liuhuang, L-C., December 2021, A review of migrant</u></a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>Regarding child labor and hazardous child labor, the minimum age for employment is 15 years and the minimum age for hazardous work is 18 years. Article 44 of the Labor Standards Act states that, “A worker over fifteen years old, but less than sixteen years old, shall be considered as a child worker. No child worker and no worker less than eighteen years old shall be permitted to do work that is potentially dangerous or hazardous in nature.” <a href="#">Labor Standards Act</a></p> <p>The Human Trafficking Prevention and Control Act (HTPCA) criminalizes all forms of human trafficking, prescribing penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment and fines up to NT\$5 million (US\$180,460). Penalties for child sex trafficking are lower depending on the circumstances. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p> <p>Taiwan has been working to transpose C188 into its national legislation. The convention has been used to inform amendments by the Taiwan government to regulations relating to labor contracts, insurance, and private employment agencies. <a href="#">Yen and Liuhuang, 2021</a></p>	<p><a href="#">labour rights protection in distant water fishing in Taiwan: From laissez-faire to regulation and challenges behind, Marine Policy, Vol. 134</a></p>
Regulation of recruitment	<p>Country’s government-sanctioned oversight mechanisms (regulations, accreditation schemes, inspection, etc.) of recruitment agents</p> <p>The Employment Services Act prohibits Taiwanese recruitment agencies from charging brokerage fees, with any fees meant to be paid by the employers. However, evidence found by Verité indicates that Taiwanese agencies require recruitment agencies in the origin country to pay a brokerage fee, which is then passed on to the workers before they depart for Taiwan. In addition, Taiwanese recruitment agencies are permitted to charge a monthly service fee to foreign contract workers. This does not reflect international standards, which require costs to be borne by the employer. <a href="#">Verité, 2018</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Verité, October 2018, Barriers to Ethical Recruitment: Action Needed in Taiwan</a></p> <p><a href="#">Five Corridors Project, July 2021, Philippines to Taiwan: Fair recruitment in Review</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>There are no laws prohibiting recruitment from countries that do not have fair recruitment laws. <a href="#">Five Corridors Project, 2021</a></p> <p>Taiwan's Ministry of Labor carried out a reported 2,363 inspections of recruitment brokers in 2021, compared to 2,617 in 2020. In addition, they conducted 111 follow up inspections due to reports of illegal withholding of documents and illegal surcharges. As a result, eight people were indicted on human trafficking charges and two of those were then convicted. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p>	
<p>Enforcement of legislation for forced labor, human trafficking, hazardous child labor, migrant worker protections, recruitment and working conditions</p>	<p>The US Department of State's 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report assigns Taiwan a Tier 1 TIP Ranking, stating that "Taiwan authorities fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking." (pg. 527)</p> <p>Overall, Taiwanese authorities increased law enforcement efforts in 2021. Authorities identified 221 human trafficking victims in 2021, including 57 victims of forced labor. Taiwan convicted more traffickers and referred more victims to shelter in 2021 than in 2020. Taiwan also improved shelter intake procedures for foreign survivors and penalized more recruitment brokers for abusive practices than in 2020. But Taiwan prosecuted fewer traffickers and identified fewer trafficking victims than in the previous reporting period. Ineffective victim identification methods made it harder for victims to receive protection or justice. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p> <p>While the authorities maintained overall protection efforts, the implementation of these protections in relation to Taiwan-flagged and -owned and Taiwan-flagged, foreign-owned fishing vessels was insufficient to identify forced labor victims aboard Taiwanese flagged fishing vessels. Workers in Taiwan's Distant Water Fleet continue to remain vulnerable to human trafficking and forced labor exploitation. Areas for Taiwan to improve upon include increased staffing and improved labor inspection protocols</p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace, 01 April 2021, 'Seafood Working Group recommends that Taiwan be downgraded in State Department Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report'</a></p> <p><a href="#">SeafoodSource, 15 April 2022, 'Campaigners demand Taiwan be downgraded in US State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report'</a></p> <p><a href="#">SeafoodSource, 28 April 2022, 'Taiwanese fishing groups</a></p>



Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>for Taiwan’s distant water fishing fleet. In previous years, labor rights groups alleged that corruption among local government officials impeded action against forced labor in fishing. But no new allegations of corruption were reported in 2021. The Fisheries Agency received labor-related complaints from migrant fishers through a migrant worker hotline but did not identify any trafficking cases. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p> <p>In April 2021 and 2022, Global Labor Justice – International Labor Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF) and Greenpeace Taiwan, on behalf of the Seafood Working Group, publicly called on the US Department of State to downgrade Taiwan from Tier 1 to Tier 2 in the 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report because of the government’s “failure” to address abuses in fishing. Taiwanese fishing representatives have protested this, citing efforts made by the fishing industry to make improvements. <a href="#">Greenpeace, 01 April 2021</a> , <a href="#">SeafoodSource, 15 April 2022</a> , <a href="#">SeafoodSource, 28 April 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">complain NGOs are ignoring industry efforts, endangering future progress'</a></p>
	<p>Information relating to the enforcement of child labor laws in Taiwan is limited. Taiwan has not been assessed by the US Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. <a href="#">US Department of Labor</a></p> <p>While children in Taiwan are subject to sex trafficking, evidence suggests that minimum age laws for work are generally effectively enforced in Taiwan by local authorities who implement compulsory education. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2021</a></p> <p>But there are problems with the prosecution of child-related trafficking cases. Although amendments have been made to the HTPCA to increase penalties for child sexual trafficking., Taiwan still prosecutes most cases of sexual trafficking of children under the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act (CYSEPA). Penalties prescribed</p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of Labor, Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2021, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Taiwan</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	for child sex trafficking are not always sufficiently stringent. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a>	
	<p>GSI: Reflecting the issues described above, the 2018 Global Slavery Index (GSI) rates the Taiwan government's response to Modern Slavery as 'CCC'. The GSI methodology states a Government Response Rating of CCC indicates that:</p> <p>"The government has a limited response to modern slavery, with limited victim support services, a criminal justice framework that criminalises some forms of modern slavery, and has policies that provide some protection for those vulnerable to modern slavery. There may be evidence of a National Action Plan and/or national coordination body. There may be evidence that some government policies and practices may criminalise and/or deport victims and/or facilitate slavery. Services may be largely provided by IOs/NGOs with international funding, with limited government funding or in-kind support."</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Est. no. of people living in modern slavery: 12,000</li> <li>• Prevalence Index Rank: 165/167</li> <li>• Vulnerability to Modern Slavery: 20.25/100</li> <li>• Government Response Rating: CCC</li> </ul> <p>Note: The GSI ranks government responses from AAA (very comprehensive response) to D (very inadequate), and a higher rating on the GSI is assumed to mean lower risk by the SSRT.</p>	<a href="#">Global Slavery Index's overall ratings</a>
	Not available.	Documentation from national labor inspection and other law enforcement agencies
	Not available.	<a href="#">ILO Committee of Expert on the Application of</a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
		<u>Conventions and Recommendations</u>
Evidence of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor in the country	<p>Fish is the only good specifically identified as produced by forced labor in Taiwan by the US Department of Labor's List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.</p> <p>However, forced labor occurs in multiple sectors in Taiwan that are reliant on migrant workers, including domestic services, fishing and agriculture, manufacturing, meat processing, and construction. Men and women from Taiwan are also subject to forced labor in Taiwan. Additionally, foreign migrants, and Taiwanese women and children are subject to sex trafficking in Taiwan.</p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of Labor, 2022, 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2021, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Taiwan</a></p>

Table 1: Taiwan - Country-level indicators

## Taiwan: Seafood industry-level indicators

Indicator	Description	Sources
Direct evidence of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor	<p>No direct evidence was found of hazardous child labor in Taiwan's seafood industry, however there is evidence of forced labor.</p> <p>The US Department of State's 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report describes evidence of forced labor onboard Taiwanese fishing vessels. Migrant fishers including Chinese, Indonesian, Filipino, and Vietnamese fishermen working on Taiwanese-owned and -flagged and Taiwanese-owned, but foreign-flagged fishing vessels have experienced abuses indicative of forced labor. Allegations include, among others, non-payment of wages and poor living conditions, threats of physical violence and the withholding of food and water by senior crewmembers. The US Department of State reports that these abuses are especially prevalent in Taiwan's distant water fishing (DWF) fleet. As the DWF fleet mainly fishes for tuna, further discussion relating to evidence in the DWF fleet is included in the fishing indicators. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p> <p>In addition, 'Fish' from Taiwan is identified as a good produced by forced labor by the US Department of Labor's 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, with specific reference to Taiwan's distant water fishing fleet. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of Labor, 2022, 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor</a></p>
ILO indicators of forced labor and <a href="#">ILO R190 definition of hazardous child labor</a>	Evidence found of indicators of forced labor in Taiwan's seafood industry relates to Taiwan's DWF fleet, which primarily fishes for tuna, and is therefore included in the fishing indicators.	
Fishing, aquaculture and processing	Labor-related fishing legislation	<a href="#">FA COA: Fisheries Act</a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
regulations and policies	<p>The main fishing authority in Taiwan is the Taiwan Fisheries Agency (FA) under the Council of Agriculture.</p> <p>Fisheries Act (07/2016):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Article 1 states that the Act will improve the livelihoods of the fishermen.</li> </ul> <p>Act for Distant Water Fisheries (07/2016):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Article 1 states that the Act will curb IUU fishing.</li> <li>Article 37 states that the punishment for IUU fishing is a fine between 6 million and 30 million New Taiwan dollars.</li> </ul> <p>The Labor Standards Act is not applicable to people working aboard DWF vessels. Instead, the FA is responsible for regulating work in the DWF fleet. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p> <p>The Labor Standards Act protects foreign migrant fishers in the coastal-offshore fishery. Protection of foreign crew members in the distant water fishery is regulated by the Acts for Distant Water Fisheries and Regulations on the Authorization and Management of Overseas Employment of Foreign Crew Members. Article 6 of the Overseas Employment Act sets the minimum monthly wage for foreign crew members at 450 USD, comparably less than the minimum monthly wage of 740 USD that is granted by the Labor Standards Act. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a>, <a href="#">Council of Agriculture, 2019</a>, <a href="#">Greenpeace, 2019</a></p> <p>The 2018 Global slavery Index identifies Taiwan as being at “high-risk of modern slavery” in the fishing industry:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Fisheries Policy (catch outside EEZ, distant water fishing, and subsidies) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High Risk.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Wealth and Institutional Capacity (GDP per capita, value landed per fisher, and unreported landings) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medium Risk.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan</a></p> <p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan’s Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">Regulations on the Authorization and Management of Overseas Employment of Foreign Crew Members, Article 6, Council of Agriculture, 2019</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace, 2019, The Two-Tiered System: Discrimination, Modern Slavery and Environmental Destruction on the High Seas</a></p> <p><a href="#">Global Slavery Index (GSI) 2018 - Fishing</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
Enforcement and implementation of industry-specific regulations and policies	<p>The 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report states that Taiwanese enforcement authorities do not have the staffing resources needed nor do they prioritize their efforts effectively to identify, investigate, and prosecute forced labor in Taiwan's DWF fleet. Meanwhile, overlapping mandates of the Ministry of Labor and the Fisheries Agency were said by civil society groups to have hindered oversight of labor conditions in the fishing industry. The number of fishing vessel inspections decreased from 2020 to 2021. The Fisheries Agency conducted unannounced inspections on 112 fishing vessels and interviewed 641 crewmembers during 2021, mostly at ports in Taiwan, compared to 124 inspections and 658 crew interviews in 2020. Inspectors identified 62 violations. NGO-reports of potential maritime forced labor were not adequately investigated. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p> <p>In May 2021, Taiwan's Control Yuan, a supervisory branch of the government, released recommendations for the government to address forced labor in the DWF fleets. It highlighted the lack of specialist knowledge needed to tackle forced labor within the Fisheries Agency, critiqued the use of survey questionnaires to inspect labor conditions, and called the labor inspection capacity for migrant fishers insufficient. <a href="#">Human Rights at Sea, 11 May 2021</a></p> <p>According to a 2020 briefing by Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), many foreign migrant fishers working on Taiwanese flagged fishing vessels do not transit through Taiwan on their way to or from the vessel and never encounter Taiwanese authorities charged with assessing labor conditions. Taiwanese inspectors are based in only seven out of 32 designated ports around the world for Taiwanese vessels. Where there are inspectors, they are generally reliant on the use of paper surveys and phone translation apps to collect information from crew, which EJF alleges have previously failed to identify human rights</p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report</a></p> <p><a href="#">Human Rights at Sea, 11 May 2021, Watershed for Human Rights in Taiwan's Fishery Sector, Dr Bonny Ling</a></p> <p><a href="#">Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), July 2020, Illegal fishing and human rights abuses in the Taiwanese fishing fleet</a></p> <p><a href="#">SeafoodSource, 02 April 2021, 'Taiwan responds to NGO reports on forced labor within its fishing fleet'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Taipei Times, 10 April 2022, 'Greenpeace seeks support for migrant fishers'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Focus Taiwan, 09 April 2022, 'Greenpeace protests for distant sea migrant fishermen rights in Taiwan'</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>issues on Taiwanese vessels. The briefing also highlights the lack of a victim-centered approach and the presence of senior crew members such as captains during inspections, which may make crew members less likely to report abuses. <a href="#">EJF, July 2020</a></p> <p>Nevertheless, the Fisheries Agency claims to be working to improve enforcement. In a statement issued to seafood media, the agency said it has made efforts to address IUU fishing and labor abuses in the fishing industry, including to improve the protection of the rights of crew, strengthen vessel inspections, and amend procedures for reporting and processing suspected cases of human rights abuses in the DWF fleet. <a href="#">SeafoodSource, 2 April 2021</a></p> <p>In April 2022, Greenpeace rallied outside the Fisheries Agency’s building in Taipei to call for better pay and working conditions for distant-water migrant fishers. In response to the rally, the Fisheries Agency stated that the Taiwanese government had made progress by updating regulations and increasing inspection coverage. It also said that the Executive Yuan had agreed to increase the agency’s manpower and would then increase the frequency of inspections of Taiwanese fishing vessels to at least once every two years. In addition, the Fisheries Agency said it would conduct joint inspections of foreign flagged, Taiwanese financed vessels. <a href="#">Taipei Times, April 10 2022</a> , <a href="#">Focus Taiwan, 09 April 2022</a></p> <p>Later that same month, Taiwan’s Kaohsiung District Prosecutors Office charged the captain, first mate, and several crew members of the Vanuatu-flagged, Taiwanese owned and operated vessel ‘Da Wang’. for their suspected involvement in the abuse of Indonesian and Filipino workers onboard the vessel. <a href="#">SeafoodSource, 12 May 2022</a></p>	<a href="#">SeafoodSource, 12 May 2022, ‘Calls grow for more transparency in Taiwan’s seafood sector as Da Wang officers prosecuted’</a>
Access to workplaces for	Information relating to access to workplaces for third-party monitors of labor conditions was not identified. Although	<a href="#">Business &amp; Human Rights Resource Center, 22 June 2020,</a>

Indicator	Description	Sources
third-party monitors (trade union representatives, on-board observers, etc.)	<p>onboard observers are engaged on some fishing vessels, their role is to monitor environmental conditions and they face significant risks of abuse.</p> <p>In March 2020, fisheries observer Eritara Kaierua was found dead on the Taiwanese flagged vessel 'Win Far No. 636'. Initial reports suggested that Kaierua died of "severe traumatic brain injuries", but the case is still open, and the vessel continues to operate in surrounding waters. <a href="#">Business &amp; Human Rights Resource Centre, 22 June 2020</a> , <a href="#">Taiwan Fisheries Agency 29 April 2020</a></p> <p>An independent investigation raised several questions as to how well the investigation was managed by the Kiribati police force and missing evidence. <a href="#">Human Rights at Sea, 19 May 2021</a></p>	<p><a href="#">'Kiribati: Pacific fisheries observer allegedly murdered aboard tuna vessel Win Far 636; company responds'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Taiwan Fisheries Agency, 29 April 2020, 'Taiwan Fisheries Agency expressed condolences on the death of a Kiribati observer and has required concerned vessel to fully cooperate with the investigation by Kiribati'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Human Rights at Sea, 19 May 2021, 'Death at Sea. Independent Case Review of Kiribati Fisheries Observer Eritara Aati Kaieru'</a></p>
Worker access to a functional grievance mechanism	<p>Migrant fishers appear to have limited access to a functional grievance mechanism. The Diplomat reports that the Yilan Migrant Fishermen's Union is understaffed and reliant on volunteers. Complaints often reach back to labor brokers and ship captains who respond with further abuse, making it difficult for workers to access grievance mechanisms safely. <a href="#">The Diplomat, 2018</a></p> <p>Migrant fishers often turn to faith-based organizations and resources from their hometowns before turning to the</p>	<p><a href="#">The Diplomat, The Dirty Secret of Taiwan's Fishing Industry, James X. Morris, 2018</a></p> <p><a href="#">The News Lens, Keelung Migrant Fishermen Form Union, Second of its</a></p>



Indicator	Description	Sources
	fishermen's union, most often because a complaint will only bring harassment from brokers. <a href="#">Kao, 2021</a>	<a href="#">Kind in Taiwan, Andi Kao, 2021</a>
Access to join a trade union	<p>Access to trade unions for migrant fishers is very limited but fishers are supported by self-organized migrant fishers' communities.</p> <p>Migrant fishers only gained the right to unionize in 2011. There are only two unions that support migrant fishers: The Yilan Migrant Fisherman's Union and the Keelung Migrant Fishermen's Union (KMFU). According to a 2018 article, the Yilan Union is understaffed by volunteers who cater to ports from all of Vietnam. <a href="#">The Diplomat, 2018</a></p> <p>The second union, KMFU, only formed in February of 2021. They have restrictions on who can join the union. For example, only migrant workers who are employed in Keelung can join the union. <a href="#">Kao, 2021</a></p> <p>Migrant fishers working in the distant water fishery are unlikely to have access to join or form trade unions due to the limited time they spend at shore. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p> <p>While not a union, the Forum Silaturahmi Pelaut Indonesia-Indonesian Seafarers "Gathering" Forum (FOSPI), is a self-organized community for migrant Indonesian fishers in Taiwan, who represent the largest proportion of migrants in the DWF fleet. <a href="#">Parhusip, 2021</a></p> <p>FOSPI provides support for Indonesian migrants, including labor dispute resolution, among other services, and seeks to advocate for fishers' rights. <a href="#">Asian-Canadian Special Events Association, 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">The Diplomat, The Dirty Secret of Taiwan's Fishing Industry, James X. Morris, 2018</a></p> <p><a href="#">The News Lens, Keelung Migrant Fishermen Form Union, Second of its Kind in Taiwan, Andi Kao, 2021</a></p> <p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">Parhusip, J.S., 2021, 'Civil Society, Political Society, and Self-organized Migrant Communities in Taiwan Ports', Conflict, Justice, Decolonization: Critical Studies of Inter-Asian Societies</a></p> <p><a href="#">Asian-Canadian Special Events</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
		<a href="#">Association, 2022, 'Stories of Indonesian Community in Tangkang'</a>
Participation in voluntary schemes and implementation of comprehensive corporate policies and strategies to combat forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor	<p>There is evidence of industry participation in voluntary schemes to improve labor conditions in the Taiwanese tuna fishing industry. <a href="#">Seafood Source, 28 April 2022</a></p> <p>Examples are provided below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In March 2022, Taiwanese tuna company Fue Shin Fishery Ltd (FSF) announced its participation in two fishery improvement projects (FIPs) to improve labor conditions and environmental oversight on thirty longline tuna vessels. Nonprofit Ocean Outcomes will support the work. <a href="#">Ocean Outcomes, 30 March 2022</a></li> <li>The Taiwan Tuna Association implemented a CCTV blockchain monitoring project with the National Chung Cheng University to monitor the DWF fleet for human rights abuses. This has been installed in five vessels at the time of the report, with four more to be installed once they return to port. Three of the more well-known tuna suppliers are taking part in the project. While it does not send live video data to port, it does send text data daily, reporting on the behavior of the crewmates on board. <a href="#">Seafood Source, 22 November 2021</a></li> <li>In 2014, Taiwan tuna fishery, F.C.F Fishery received the Friend of the Sea certification for their purse seine vessels. The Friend of the Sea Certification includes a criterion for social accountability. <a href="#">The Fish Site, 14 November 2014</a></li> </ul>	<p><a href="#">Seafood Source, 28 April 2022, 'Taiwanese fishing groups complain NGOs are ignoring industry efforts, endangering future progress'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Ocean Outcomes, 30 March 2022, 'Leading Taiwanese Tuna Company Pursues Sustainability Status'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Seafood Source, 22 November 2021, 'Taiwan's tuna industry adopts CCTV, blockchain in effort to mend image'</a></p> <p><a href="#">The Fish Site, 14 November 2014, 'Taiwan Tuna Fishery Certified Friend of the Sea'</a></p>

Table 2: Taiwan - Seafood industry-level indicators

## Taiwan: Fishing indicators

Indicator	Description	Sources
Direct evidence of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor	<p>There is evidence of systematic practices of forced labor and conditions indicative of forced labor onboard Taiwanese-owned and -flagged and Taiwanese-owned, foreign flagged distant water fishing (DWF) vessels. While reports about forced labor abuses in the DWF fleet do not always specify the species that vessels are fishing for, the DWF fleet primarily fishes for tuna and therefore evidence relating to distant water fishing is included here.</p> <p>Notably, the US Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor included Taiwan for the first time in 2020 and again in 2022, identifying ‘fish’ caught by the DWF fleet as a good produced by adults under forced labor. <a href="#">US Department of Labor, 2020</a> , <a href="#">US Department of Labor, 2022</a></p> <p>Previously, investigations by non-governmental organizations like Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) and Greenpeace have revealed numerous instances of egregious abuses in the DWF fleet:</p> <p>EJF reports that migrant fishers based in Taiwan and in the DWF fleet are regularly subject to recruitment fees and wage deductions by brokers, resulting in fishers becoming debt bonded, which prevents them from leaving their employer even under abusive working and living conditions. In some cases, fishers that spoke to EJF reported being recruited with false promises, having their identity documents confiscated, payments withheld, and witnessing physical abuse. <a href="#">EJF, March 2018</a></p> <p>In an investigation by EJF of 62 vessels linked to Taiwan and based on interviews with Indonesian crew from 2018 to 2020, the withholding of wages was the most common human rights issue reported. Other common abuses were excessive overtime, physical abuse, and verbal abuse. The briefing outlines several cases where Taiwanese flagged</p>	<p><a href="#">US Department of Labor, 2020, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of Labor, 2022, 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor</a></p> <p><a href="#">Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), March 2018, Human trafficking in Taiwan’s fisheries sector</a></p> <p><a href="#">Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), July 2020, Illegal fishing and human rights abuses in the Taiwanese fishing fleet</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace, 2018, Misery at Sea: Human suffering Taiwan’s distant water fishing fleet</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace Southeast Asia, December 2019, Seabound: The Journey to Modern</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>tuna fishing vessels were linked to human rights abuses indicating forced labor and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In one example relating to a tuna longline vessel operating in the Indian Ocean (case study vessel A), the crew member interviewed described instances of severe physical abuse and restriction of movement, as well as illegal shark finning practices. Among other labor abuses, multiple interviewees reported working for around 20 hours a day and experiencing physical abuse by the Taiwanese captains. <a href="#">EJF, July 2020</a></p> <p>Greenpeace’s 2018 report ‘Misery at Sea’ outlines three investigations covering:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• evidence of convicted human traffickers still engaged in the recruitment of migrant workers for Taiwanese DWF vessels.</li> <li>• the 2015 death of Indonesian fisher, Supriyanto, on Taiwanese vessel, ‘Fu Tsz Chiun’, including evidence of physical abuse prior to his death and indications of forced labor, and allegations that Taiwanese authorities failed to properly investigate it.</li> <li>• the death of the captain of the Taiwanese longliner, ‘Tunago No. 61’ in which the Indonesian crew members found guilty of murdering the captain claim to have been subject to numerous abuses indicative of forced labor by the captain, including verbal and physical abuse, over a prolonged period onboard. <a href="#">Greenpeace, 2018</a></li> </ul> <p>Greenpeace Southeast Asia’s 2019 report ‘Seabound: The Journey to Modern Slavery on the High Seas’, links the Taiwanese tuna longliner ‘Da Wang’ to several indicators of forced labor that fall under both components of the ILO’s definition of forced labor, “menace of penalty” and “involuntariness”, leading us to conclude the presence of forced labor. <a href="#">Greenpeace Southeast Asia, December 2019</a></p> <p>In January 2022, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a forced labor finding against the ‘Da Wang’,</p>	<p><a href="#">Slavery on the High Seas</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of Homeland Security, 28 January 2022, ‘DHS Takes Action to Combat Forced Labor and Hold Companies Accountable for Exploiting Workers’</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>after finding evidence of all eleven of the ILO's forced labor indicators on the vessel. This follows the issuance of a withhold release order against the vessel in 2020 (see below). <a href="#">US Department of Homeland Security, 28 January 2022</a></p>	
<p>ILO indicators of forced labor and ILO R190 definition of hazardous child labor</p>	<p>In 2018, the Taiwanese DWF vessel 'FUH SHENG NO. 11' became the first fishing vessel to be detained under the ILO Work in Fishing Convention. The vessel was detained in Cape Town, South Africa following an inspection by the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) that found serious concerns about the health and safety conditions on board, as well as a lack of documentation such as work agreements. Abusive working and living conditions are an indicator of the possible existence of forced labor. After the vessel was released by South Africa, the Taiwan government carried out an inspection of the vessel including crew interviews and found evidence of offences including claims physical abuse toward the crew (another indicator of forced labor). <a href="#">ILO, 17 July 2018</a> , <a href="#">Yen and Liuhuang, 2021</a></p> <p>The US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued multiple withhold release orders against tuna and other seafood products from Taiwan flagged and/or owned distant water fishing vessels, citing information indicating forced labor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective December 31 2020, the 'Lien Yi Hsing No. 12', a Taiwanese flagged and owned DWF vessel</li> <li>• Effective August 18, 2020, the 'Da Wang', a Vanuatu-flagged, Taiwan-owned distant water fishing vessel</li> <li>• Effective May 11, 2020, the 'Yu Long No. 2', a Taiwanese flagged fishing vessel</li> <li>• Effective February 4, 2019 (revoked April 1, 2020), the 'Tunago No.61', a Vanuatu-flagged Taiwanese owned fishing vessel.</li> </ul>	<p><a href="#">International Labour Organization (ILO), 17 July 2018, 'First fishing vessel detained under ILO Fishing Convention'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Yen, K-W., and Liuhuang, L-C., December 2021, A review of migrant labour rights protection in distant water fishing in Taiwan: From laissez-faire to regulation and challenges behind, Marine Policy, Vol. 134</a></p> <p><a href="#">U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 31 December 2020, 'CBP Issues Withhold Release Order on Seafood Harvested with Forced Labor by Lein Yi Hsing No. 12'</a></p> <p><a href="#">U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 18 August 2020, 'CBP Issues Detention</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>Indicators of forced labor identified by the US CBP included deception, withholding of wages, debt bondage, physical violence, and abusive living and working conditions.</p> <p>Greenpeace East Asia's 2020 report 'Choppy Waters: Forced Labour and Illegal Fishing in Taiwan's Distant Water Fisheries' reveals several indicators of forced labor on Taiwanese distant water vessels. Interviews by Greenpeace East Asia with Indonesian migrant fishers that had worked aboard Taiwanese distant water vessels and an assessment of their contracts revealed instances of wage deductions and indications of debt bondage, crew being transferred at sea, and abusive working and living conditions, including working hours of 18 hours per day and a lack of safety equipment for crew. <a href="#">Greenpeace East Asia, March 2020</a></p> <p>Greenpeace Southeast Asia's 2019 report 'Seabound: The Journey to Modern Slavery on the High Seas', links allegations from Indonesian migrant workers from five Taiwanese vessels to multiple ILO indicators of forced labor, including, among others, deception, withholding of wages, physical violence, and abusive working and living conditions. Findings for four of the vessels are insufficient to conclude forced labor but only the risk of forced labor. The findings were only sufficient for us to conclude the likely occurrence of forced labor on one vessel; the fifth vessel 'Da Wang', noted in the indicator above. In addition, the report highlights how recruitment fees and guarantee deposits are deducted by foreign brokers from the migrant fisher's salary, sometimes leaving them with a monthly income of only 50 USD. Although the brokers claim that the deposits are returned to the crew upon finishing their contract, this situation is indicative of debt bondage and Greenpeace reports that there are cases where guarantee deposits have not been returned even though the migrant fishers fulfilled their contracts. <a href="#">Greenpeace Southeast Asia, December 2019</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Order on Seafood Harvested with Forced Labor'</a></p> <p><a href="#">U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 11 May 2020, 'CBP Issues Detention Order on Seafood Harvested with Forced Labor'</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace East Asia, March 2020, Choppy Waters: Forced Labour and Illegal Fishing in Taiwan's Distant Water Fisheries</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace Southeast Asia, December 2019, Seabound: The Journey to Modern Slavery on the High Seas</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace, 2020, Briefing on Taiwan for the US Department of Labor 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>A 2020 briefing by Greenpeace reports eight cases of suspected forced labor on Taiwanese flagged, owned, or linked distant water fishing vessels:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Taiwanese-owned, Vanuatu flagged 'Chin Chun 12' was linked to allegations of non-payment by an Indonesian migrant worker, who reported that he was not paid for the two years from 2017 to 2019 that he had worked onboard.</li> <li>• The Taiwanese-owned, Vanuatu flagged 'Da Wang' was linked to excessive working hours of 22 hours a day and abuse onboard by an Indonesian migrant worker.</li> <li>• The Taiwanese flagged 'Fwu Maan 88' was linked by three Indonesian migrant workers to verbal and physical abuse of crew onboard as well as the retention of crew passports by the vessel captain.</li> <li>• The Taiwanese flagged 'Lien Yi Hsing 12', allegedly withheld wages from two Indonesian migrant workers for the duration of their contract.</li> <li>• The Taiwanese vessel 'Shin Jaan Shin' allegedly withheld wages from an Indonesian migrant worker for an unknown amount of time.</li> <li>• The Taiwanese vessel 'Wei Ching' allegedly withheld wages from the crew, retained their passports and contracts, made them work 18 hours a day without rest days, and did not provide adequate living conditions.</li> <li>• The Taiwanese flagged 'Vessel A' was linked by two migrant workers to excessive working hours, wage deductions, and the retention of passports by the captain.</li> <li>• Japanese flagged 'Vessel B', suspected by Greenpeace to be Taiwanese owned, was linked to improper work contracts that stated the worker could be moved to another vessel without their consent and could not terminate their employment on any basis, as well as the withholding of wages and passports, and insufficient rest hours.</li> </ul> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace, 2020</a></p>	



Indicator	Description	Sources
Fishing Characteristics	<p>Thirty or more days at sea</p> <p>A study done by EIJ found that DWF vessels can spend months to years at sea, transferring their catch to other vessels to send it to port. <a href="#">EIJ, 2018</a></p> <p>Similarly, a report by the Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF) states that crew working on board Taiwan’s DWF vessels spend six months to three years at sea per trip. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p> <p>According to a new plan to improve conditions in fishing, announced in April 2022, the government will require vessels to install technology to confirm whether the crew’s time out at sea exceeds limits. <a href="#">Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 21 April 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Environmental Justice Foundation (EIJ), 2018, Shocking Extent of Human Rights Abuses in Taiwan Fisheries Revealed</a></p> <p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 21 April 2022, ‘Government promotes plan to improve human rights in fishery industry’</a></p>
	<p>Targeting overexploited stocks</p> <p>Some tropical tuna stocks targeted by Taiwan in the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean are overfished or being overfished.</p> <p><b>FishSource Scores</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bigeye– Atlantic Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health – 6.7</li> <li>○ Future Health – 7.2</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Bigeye– Eastern Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health - ≥ 6</li> <li>○ Future Health - ≥ 6</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Bigeye– Western and Central Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health – 10.0</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><a href="#">FishSource</a></p> <p><a href="#">International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF), March 2022, Status of the World Fisheries for Tuna</a></p> <p><a href="#">Seafood Watch, Seafood Recommendations</a></p>



Indicator	Description	Sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Future Health – 9.0</li> <li>• Skipjack– Western and Central Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health – 10.0</li> <li>○ Future Health – 10.0</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin– Atlantic Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health – 7.8</li> <li>○ Future Health – 8.9</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin– Eastern Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health - <math>\geq 6</math></li> <li>○ Future Health - <math>\geq 6</math></li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin – Indian Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health - <math>&lt; 6</math></li> <li>○ Future Health - <math>&lt; 6</math></li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin– Western and Central Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Health – 10.0</li> <li>○ Future Health – 10.0</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>ISSF March 2022 status report</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Atlantic Ocean Bigeye - “The stock is estimated to be overfished, but overfishing is not occurring.”</li> <li>• Eastern Pacific Ocean Bigeye - “Bigeye catches in the EPO by other gears are very minor. The bigeye stock in the EPO is expected to be fluctuating around the MSY level.”</li> <li>• Western and Central Pacific Ocean Bigeye - “The latest assessment indicates that the WCPO bigeye tuna stock is not overfished, with biomass above the limit reference point established by WCPFC, and that overfishing is not occurring.”</li> <li>• Indian Ocean Bigeye – “Overfishing is occurring, but the stock is not overfished.”</li> <li>• Western and Central Pacific Ocean Skipjack – “Overfishing is not occurring and the stock is not overfished.”</li> <li>• Indian Ocean Skipjack – “Overfishing is not occurring and the stock is not overfished.”</li> <li>• Atlantic Ocean Yellowfin – “The yellowfin tuna stock in the Atlantic Ocean is not overfished and overfishing is not taking place.”</li> </ul>	

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eastern Pacific Ocean Yellowfin - “The yellowfin stock in the EPO is not currently overfished and overfishing is not taking place.”</li> <li>• Western and Central Pacific Ocean Yellowfin - “The Western and Central Pacific yellowfin tuna stock is not overfished, and overfishing is not occurring. Most of the catches are taken from the tropical region where the stock is considered fully exploited and there is little or no room for increased fishing pressure in this region.”</li> <li>• Indian Ocean Yellowfin – “The stock is estimated to be overfished and overfishing is occurring due to an increase in catch levels in recent years.”</li> </ul> <p><b>Seafood Watch</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bigeye – Atlantic Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Trolling lines – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line - – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> <li>○ Drifting longlines - AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Bigeye – Indian Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line – AVOID</li> <li>○ Drifting longlines - AVOID</li> <li>○ Trolling lines – AVOID</li> <li>○ Purse seine (Associated and Un-Associated) – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Bigeye - Western and Central Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line – BEST CHOICE</li> <li>○ Longline (deep set) — GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Drifting longlines – AVOID</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Skipjack - Western and Central Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Trolling lines – BEST CHOICE</li> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line – BEST CHOICE</li> <li>○ Unassociated purse seine – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Longline (deep set) — GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> <li>• Skipjack - Eastern Atlantic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Trolling lines – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Unassociated purse seine – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line - – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Skipjack – Western Atlantic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Trolling lines – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line - – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Unassociated purse seine – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin -Western and Central Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line – BEST CHOICE</li> <li>○ Trolling lines – BEST CHOICE</li> <li>○ Longline (deep set) — GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Unassociated purse seine – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin – Eastern Pacific Ocean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Drifting longlines – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin – Western Atlantic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Trolling lines – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Handlines and hand operated pole and line - – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Unassociated purse seine – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Drifting longlines – AVOID</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Yellowfin – Eastern Atlantic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Unassociated purse seine – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Trolling lines – GOOD ALTERNATIVE</li> <li>○ Drifting longlines – AVOID</li> <li>○ Floating object purse seine – AVOID</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	

Indicator	Description	Sources
Evidence of correlated practices	<p>IUU fishing</p> <p>Taiwan was issued a yellow card for IUU fishing in October 2015 by the European commission. The European Commission revoked the yellow card in June 2019 in response to Taiwan's efforts to tackle the issue. <a href="#">European Commission, Overview of existing procedures as regards third countries</a></p> <p>The yellow card was issued for the following reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Between 2010 and 2015, there were a reported twenty-two vessels involved with IUU fishing.</li> <li>• One Taiwanese vessel, Yu Fong 168 was still listed as an IUU vessel and Taiwan stated it had not been in control of the vessel since 2009. They stated that they had imposed fines on the vessel without providing any other information.</li> <li>• A Taiwanese vessel was detained for IUU fishing as well as interfering with observers in 2015 at the Marshall Islands. Taiwan did not sanction the vessel or the Taiwanese crewmates, they informed the EU commission the Marshall Islands was responsible for the case.</li> <li>• After twenty vessels were caught fishing illegally, the Fisheries Agency responded with arguments that their equipment was working properly. They did not explain if they were aware of these incidents or if they were going to cooperate with the coastal states in investigating the Taiwanese vessels. <a href="#">European Commission, 2015</a></li> </ul> <p>Taiwan worked with the European Commission for three and a half years to implement enough regulations to have the yellow card revoked. Measures taken by the Taiwanese authorities included: improved monitoring and control tools for the distant water fleet, enhanced traceability through the seafood supply chain, and increased human and financial resources to fight against IUU fishing. <a href="#">European Commission, 27 June 2019</a></p>	<p><a href="#">European Commission, Overview of existing procedures as regards third countries</a></p> <p><a href="#">European Commission, 2015</a></p> <p><a href="#">European Commission, June 2019, Press Release: Illegal fishing: EU lifts Taiwan's yellow card following reforms</a></p> <p><a href="#">European Commission, 27 June 2019, Questions and Answers – Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in general and in Taiwan</a></p> <p><a href="#">Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), July 2020, Illegal fishing and human rights abuses in the Taiwanese fishing fleet</a></p> <p><a href="#">NOAA Fisheries, August 2021, Improving International Fisheries</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>Despite these actions, the Taiwanese fleet continues to be linked to IUU fishing and the risk of IUU fishing:</p> <p>In interviews conducted between 2018 and 2020 by Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) with crew from Taiwanese flagged or owned vessels, EJF found evidence of IUU fishing including shark finning by tuna fishing vessels. <a href="#">EJF, July 2020</a></p> <p>The NOAA 2021 Report to Congress on IUU reports that Taiwan has engaged in IUU fishing. These reports focused on illegal shark and turtle fishing, as well as transshipment of those fins. <a href="#">NOAA Fisheries, August 2021</a></p> <p>The IUU Fishing Index (2019) gives Taiwan a score of 3.34 out of 5 (where higher scores indicate worse performance) and describes Taiwan as a country of particular concern. Taiwan is ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> out of 152 countries overall, and 2<sup>nd</sup> out of 20 Asian countries and 2<sup>nd</sup> out of Western Pacific Ocean countries (where ranks closer to 1 indicate worse performance). Out of the three categories assessed (Vulnerability, Prevalence and Response) Taiwan scores most poorly on the general score by response (score 3.14) and under the framing of flag score by vulnerability (score 5.00). <a href="#">IUU Fishing Index 2019</a></p> <p>The IUU Fishing Index (2021) gives Taiwan a score of 2.88 out of 5, indicating an improvement from the 2019 index. But Taiwan remains a country of concern in 2021. Showing some improvement but still placing poorly, Taiwan is ranked 6<sup>th</sup> out of 152 countries, 3<sup>rd</sup> out of 20 Asian countries, and 4<sup>th</sup> out of 29 Western Pacific countries. Out of the three categories assessed (Vulnerability, Prevalence and Response) Taiwan still scores most poorly on the general score by response (score 2.43) and under the framing of flag score by vulnerability (score 5.00). <a href="#">IUU Fishing Index 2021</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Management: 2021 Report to Congress</a></p> <p><a href="#">IUU Fishing Index 2019</a></p> <p><a href="#">IUU Fishing Index 2021</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>Transshipment</p> <p>Taiwanese fishing vessels conduct transshipment in foreign ports and at sea in Taiwan’s EEZ and on the high seas. <a href="#">Pramod, G., 2017</a></p> <p>The NOAA 2021 Report to Congress on IUU fishing identifies Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessels engaging in transshipment of shark fins, citing crew testimonies in the Greenpeace report, “Choppy Waters: Forced Labor and Illegal Fishing in Taiwan’s Distant Water Fisheries”. <a href="#">NOAA Fisheries, August 2021</a></p> <p>According to a report by The Stimson Centre, referring to Taiwan’s DWF fleet: “Their vessels often utilize transshipment vessels to bring their catch to market and to facilitate longer periods at sea.” Nonetheless, transshipment estimates based on analysis of AIS data for vessels in the top five DWF fleets operating in non-neighboring EEZs indicate that 3.82% of fishing activity by Taiwan’s DWF fleet is potentially transshipped. This represents a comparatively small proportion of transshipment compared to other major DWF fleets South Korea and Japan, for which estimates are 19.45% and 9.96%, respectively. <a href="#">The Stimson Center, November 2019</a></p> <p>The US Department of State reports that Taiwanese fishing vessels use transshipment or stop at uninhabited islands to resupply, transfer crew, and offload illegally caught fish. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Pramod, G., 2017. Taiwan – Country Report, 10 pages, In: Policing the Open Seas: Global Assessment of Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance in 84 countries, IUU Risk Intelligence – Policy Report No.1 1, Canada, 814 pages</a></p> <p><a href="#">NOAA Fisheries, August 2021, Improving International Fisheries Management: 2021 Report to Congress</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace East Asia, March 2020, Choppy Waters: Forced Labour and Illegal Fishing in Taiwan’s Distant Water Fisheries</a></p> <p><a href="#">The Stimson Center, November 2019, Shining a Light: The Need for Transparency across Distant Water Fishing</a></p> <p><a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
		<a href="#">Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan</a>
	<p>Suspect or illegal flagging practices</p> <p>Taiwan is not listed as a flag of convenience (FOC) by the ITF's fair practices committee. <a href="#">ITF</a></p> <p>However, Chiang and Rogovin (December 2020) states that a significant number of vessels in Taiwan's distant water fishing fleet use FOCs from other countries, for example, the Marshall Islands and Vanuatu. According to official figures from the Fisheries Agency, 259 vessels in Taiwan's DWF fleet are FOC vessels, but the actual number of FOC vessels is thought to be at least three times that of the official figure. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p> <p>Three cases were identified of ships using the Taiwanese flag for IUU practices in the Combined IUU Vessels List, all have been delisted. <a href="#">Trygg Mat Tracking, No date</a></p>	<p>International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) <a href="#">Flag of Convenience FOC countries</a></p> <p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">Trygg Mat Tracking, No date, Combined IUU Vessels List</a></p>
	<p>AIS dark spots to conceal criminal activities</p> <p>A 2019 review of AIS-based fishing activity did not find any AIS regulations for Taiwan. But it notes a high use of AIS by Taiwan's Distant Water Fleet. They often have a higher percentage of vessels in Exclusive Economic Zones of foreign nations. The report identifies that the Taiwanese fleet commonly uses Class B AIS devices, which suffer from poorer reception quality than Class A devices. As a result, AIS coverage may be incomplete. <a href="#">FAO, 2019</a></p> <p>Reports suggest that Taiwanese fishing vessels selectively disable their transponders to evade law enforcement. <a href="#">Pramod, G., 2017</a> , <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">FAO, 2019, Global Atlas of AIS fishing activity</a></p> <p><a href="#">Pramod, G., 2017. Taiwan – Country Report, 10 pages, In: Policing the Open Seas: Global Assessment of Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance in 84 countries, IUU Risk Intelligence – Policy</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
		<a href="#">Report No.1 1, Canada, 814 pages</a>  <a href="#">US Department of State, 2022, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan</a>
Workforce Characteristics	<p>The proportion of fishers that are migrant workers</p> <p>Most fishers on Taiwanese vessels are foreign migrant workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In 2019, over 22,000 migrant workers were employed in Taiwan’s distant water fishing fleet, which primarily fishes for tuna. Of which, nearly 13,000 workers were from Indonesia, nearly 6,000 workers were from the Philippines, and nearly 1,000 were from Vietnam. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p> <p>According to Taiwan’s Fisheries Agency, there were “21,994 migrant fishers from Indonesia and 7,730 from the Philippines” in Taiwan’s coastal and distant water fishing vessels in 2019. The same report indicates that about 22,710 migrant fishers were hired overseas to work on Taiwanese fishing operations and about 12,223 were hired in Taiwan through their national system. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p> <p>The US Department of State cites similar numbers of migrant fishers working in Taiwan’s DWF fleet, including an estimated 8,000 Filipino and more than 20,000 Indonesian workers. <a href="#">US Department of State, 2021</a></p> <p>Migrant workers in Taiwan’s DWF fleet are primarily employed as low-level crew members. <a href="#">Yen and Liuhuang, 2021</a></p>	<a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a>  <a href="#">US Department of State, 2021, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Taiwan</a>  <a href="#">Yen, K-W., and Liuhuang, L-C., December 2021, A review of migrant labour rights protection in distant water fishing in Taiwan: From laissez-faire to regulation and challenges behind, Marine Policy, Vol. 134</a>
	A high proportion of fishers from ethnic minority and other marginalized groups	<a href="#">Yen, K-W., and Liuhuang, L-C.,</a>



Indicator	Description	Sources
	The proportion of tuna fishers from ethnic minorities and other marginalized groups is unknown, but according to Yen and Liu Huang (2021), Taiwanese indigenous people are often employed in leadership roles (captains, chief mates, and chief engineers) in the DWF fleet.	<a href="#">December 2021, A review of migrant labour rights protection in distant water fishing in Taiwan: From laissez-faire to regulation and challenges behind, Marine Policy, Vol. 134</a>
Recruitment and Contracts	<p>Use of recruitment agents</p> <p>Use of third-party recruitment agents is common. Migrant fishers are normally recruited to the DWF fleet from other countries in Asia such as the Philippines and Indonesia.</p>	<a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a>
	<p>Contract-and compensation- related regulations and practices</p> <p>According to Chiang and Rogovin (December 2020), employment contracts typically last for three years and should not exceed 12 years in accordance with the Employment service Act. <a href="#">Chiang and Rogovin, December 2020</a></p> <p>Article 6 of the Overseas Employment Act states "The monthly wage of the foreign crew member shall not be less than 450 US Dollars." Notably less than the minimum monthly wage of US\$740 that is granted to migrant fishers in the coastal-offshore fishery by the Labor Standards Act. <a href="#">Council of Agriculture, 2019</a>,</p> <p>According to Greenpeace Southeast Asia (2019), migrant fishers are typically contracted on DWF vessels for two</p>	<p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">Regulations on the Authorization and Management of Overseas Employment of Foreign Crew Members, Article 6,</a></p>

Indicator	Description	Sources
	<p>years with a monthly gross salary ranging from US\$300 to US\$500, indicating that some workers are paid below the minimum monthly wage. Furthermore, the report highlights how recruitment fees and guarantee deposits are deducted from the migrant fisher's salary, sometimes leaving them with a monthly income of only US\$50. <a href="#">Greenpeace Southeast Asia, December 2019</a></p> <p>The government plans to raise the minimum legal compensation for migrant fishers from US\$450 to \$550, to require wages to be paid directly to workers, and to cap continuous service onboard at 10 months beginning July 2022. <a href="#">Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 21 April 2022</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Council of Agriculture, 2019</a></p> <p><a href="#">Greenpeace Southeast Asia, December 2019, Seabound: The Journey to Modern Slavery on the High Seas</a></p> <p><a href="#">Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 21 April 2022, 'Government promotes plan to improve human rights in fishery industry'</a></p>

Table 3: Taiwan - Fishing indicators

## Taiwan: Processing indicators

Indicator	Description	Sources
Direct evidence of forced labor, human trafficking, and hazardous child labor	No evidence found.	
ILO indicators of forced labor and ILO R190 definition of hazardous child labor	No evidence found.	
Processing Characteristics	<p>Processing stage</p> <p>There is currently only one company certified to export tuna to the European Union, Tong-Ho Food. They produce canned tuna for export. <a href="#">Global Labor Justice, 2020</a></p> <p>Other companies such as F.C.F clean and ship tuna to other countries, but they work with other processing companies instead of owning them. <a href="#">FCF Co</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum</a></p> <p><a href="#">FCF Co</a></p>
	<p>Consolidation and vertical integration</p> <p>Companies such as FCF advertise a network of distant water fishing fleets that all transship fish to transport them to processing plants and storage facilities.</p>	<a href="#">FCF: Transshipments</a>
	<p>Domestic versus export</p> <p>Taiwan exports fish caught by the distant water fleet, including tuna, while local catches such as oysters and milkfish are kept domestically. Taiwan exports tuna to Japan and Thailand. <a href="#">Global Labor Justice, 2020</a></p>	<p><a href="#">Chiang, M., and Rogovin, K., December 2020, Labor Abuse in Taiwan's Seafood Industry &amp; Local Advocacy for Reform, Global Labor Justice-</a></p>

		<a href="#">International Labor Rights Forum</a>
Workforce Characteristics	<p>Skilled versus low-skilled</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>The proportion of women in the workforce</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>The proportion of migrant versus local workers</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>The proportion of minority or indigenous workers</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>The proportion of temporary and contract versus permanent workers</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>Workers' origins</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>Migrant worker language (vs. dominant language in the industry)</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>GDP per capita of processing country and main worker source country</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>Legal presence (regularity) of migrant workers</p> <p>Unknown.</p>	
	<p>The ability of migrant workers to change jobs</p>	

	Unknown.	
Recruitment and Contracts	Use of contractors and recruitment agents  Unknown.	
	Compensation method  The national minimum wage in Taiwan is NT\$25,250 per month (approximately US\$798). The minimum wages in tuna processing are unknown.	<a href="#">Wageindicator</a>

Table 4: Taiwan - Processing indicators

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